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Abstract 
This paper considers implications for the English voluntary sector of recent shifts in the 
terms of engagement with the state following rapid political and policy changes under the 
UK Coalition government.  It explores how ideas of what constitutes the voluntary sector 
are being reconstructed in policy and practical settings, examining processes contributing to 
re-shaping the voluntary sector’s conception of itself and beliefs about legitimate activities 
and aspirations. It draws on theories of institutional isomorphism and governmentality to 
explore these changes which appear to be modifying and restricting the voluntary sector’s 
role in social welfare, limiting its influence and its ability to act simultaneously within and 
against the state. The paper argues the integral role of the state in recasting the roles of 
different sectors but also discusses the extent to which voluntary sector compliance is 
necessary to ensure organisational survival, asking what spaces exist for independent 
activity and resistance.  
Introduction: Realigning social welfare and the emphasis for voluntary organisations  
As governments across Europe counter economic crises by restricting welfare services and 
resources, the emphasis on non-state provision and community-based solutions to growing 
socio-economic problems increases. Over several decades, a neo-liberal economic approach 
has pervaded political thought in the UK and elsewhere, privileging markets and New 
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Public Management arrangements in public services (Clarke et al., 2000). Accordingly, 
outsourcing public services to both for-profit and non-profit providers has steadily 
expanded. Simultaneously, significant reductions to public welfare spending have provoked 
growing concerns about maintaining provision in poorer areas (Taylor, 2011).  
Historically, voluntary organisations (VOs) have addressed significant gaps in state welfare 
and, indeed, Beveridge (1948) argued for their importance alongside new state welfare 
services in the 1950s to maintain an innovative influence. Under New Labour, the sector 
gained more prominance, presenting an ideological alternative to address both market and 
state failures in service delivery, and expertise in tackling intractable social problems 
(Milbourne, 2013). Outsourced services and diverse community initiatives produced 
considerable growth and development among VOs, underpinned by rising income to the 
sector (NCVO, 2013). VOs were also recognised as offering comparative advantages over 
both private and public sectors in terms of costs and flexibility in providing marginal and 
specialist services (Billis and Glennerster, 1998).  
Under the Coalition policy, perceptions around VOs and welfare are transforming, 
representing a ‘paradigm shift’ in how the voluntary sector (VS) is understood (Macmillan, 
2013a: 186).  In material terms, the income growth from which many VOs benefited for 
nearly a decade has reversed; corporate contractors are being favoured; and local 
infrastructure support organisations remodelled (BLF, 2011) and decimated. Market 
competition and private enterprise are now positioned as necessary ways of resolving 
service problems, and VOs have been relegated to largely unpaid community work or 
corporate sub-contractors. Since 2009–10, income to the voluntary sector overall has 
dropped significantly due to reductions in grants and philanthropy, and loss of service 
contracts and remaining income has been eroded by rising inflation  (NCVO, 2013).  
 
The paper initially discusses recent policy transformations in relation to the VS. It then 
considers the influence of dominant organisational cultures and governmental powers on 
shifts in VS values and arrangements, drawing on new institutional theory, in particular 
isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983), and governmentality (Rose, 1999). 
Subsequent sections consider the application of these theoretical perspectives to empirical 
examples drawn from several welfare fields, offering insights into the kinds of future roles 
-3- 
that VOs can expect to play, and examining the government’s claimed commitment to 
involve the VS. There is still limited empirical data on the effects of recent changes on 
VOs; and the fieldwork illuminates how, despite perspectives shaped through processes of 
governmentality and isomorphism, VOs can also regain agency to assert their own agendas 
within and against the contemporary policy and political landscape. 
Contemporary policy shifts: realigned roles for voluntary organisations 
The UK voluntary sector has a long history of providing social and humanitarian welfare, 
adapting to the demands and funding vagaries of governments and addressing gaps in state 
provision (Lewis, 2005). The continually shifting boundaries around the sector’s status, 
prompt questions about the extent to which we are witnessing a fundamental shift rather 
than further incremental changes.  
New Labour’s collaboration with the VS depended increasingly on its adoption of 
managerial behaviours copied from the corporate sector and competitive practices (Harris 
and Rochester, 2001; Harris 2010) and, later, a willingness by VOs to build capacity, 
collaborate or merge to undertake larger service contracts (Milbourne, 2013). However, a 
continuing service delivery role under the Coalition may depend less on adaption and more 
on compliance with inflexible and harsh terms of service sub-contracting. Engagement with 
this new ‘public’ services agenda also implies complicity in the shift towards the longer 
term privatisation of welfare services, prompting questions about whether this signals a 
demise of approaches and values for which, hitherto, VOs have been sought as service 
contributors (Buckingham, 2011).  
As service contracts are scaled up and rolled out, excluding many VOs as principal 
contractors, the Coalition commitment to a crucial, continuing role in funded service 
delivery is proving hollow for most VOs (Marsden, 2011). It is also clear that risks are 
increasingly being shifted to small sub-contractors lacking adequate financial reserves to 
manage these (Horton, 2013), belying the rationale for the scale and financial criteria 
characterising recent contracts. Paradoxically, the failures and poor practices of corporate 
contractors (Rees et al., 2013; Wright, 2013) emphasise other risks in new arrangements – 
delivering inadequate services – but have done little to curb government enthusiasm for 
privatisation. However, as Murray (2012: 63) indicates, the rhetorical inclusion of VOs as 
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providers, ‘confuses the public and leaves the VS compromised as a “Trojan horse”’; while 
corporates include VOs as ‘bid candy’, subsequently discarded.  This discussion 
problematises VOs’ involvement, illustrating how more than a decade of dependence on 
government resources has exacerbated their current vulnerability, potentially compromising 
independent purposes and activities, notably those concerned with social change and 
justice.  
Service providers comprise one segment of a diverse non-profit sector: effectively a loose 
alliance of differing interest groups. Large charities delivering services have been among 
the most visible and prominent actors, while many small community based VOs remain 
under the radar (McCabe and Phillimore, 2010), receiving little or no state funding. Open 
Public Services, Localism and Big Society rhetoric proposes other roles for the VS, 
including in community organising (Taylor, 2012), supporting voluntary activities 
(Rochester, 2013) and, increasingly, providing a volunteer-led welfare safety-net where 
funded services are inadequate. These roles are historically familiar but also illustrate a re-
shaping of community action alongside welfare provision (Milbourne, 2013). While some 
VOs have engaged enthusiastically in local community action plans, criticism has emerged 
about top-down rhetoric stifling local empowerment (Padley, 2013) and around the burdens 
and growing geographic inequalities arising from over-stretched voluntary resources in 
poorer areas (Lindsey, 2013).  
Government policy has effectively blurred the lines between funded services and unfunded 
community activities, promoting ‘people doing things for themselves’ as a virtue, integral 
to repairing a broken, state-dependent British society (Blond, 2010). However, the 
increasing restrictions on community voice and advocacy activities since 2010 (Baring 
Foundation, 2014) tell a different story, with the recent ‘Lobbying Act’ further constraining 
how VOs can engage independently. Further contradictions are also visible: dispersed 
service arrangements, and a decoupling of the state and VOs, offer apparently increased 
freedoms for civil society organisations; yet VOs are further restricted, both in service 
delivery and community activities. Despite inherent contradictions, these changes illustrate 
a recasting of state-voluntary sector relationships signalling that, alongside transformation 
in perceptions of welfare, new understandings of the VS are needed.  
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Framing the debates: isomorphism and governmentality 
Discussing the history of the UK voluntary sector, Kendall and Knapp (1996) underline the 
complex balance of state and VS welfare through the last two centuries, illustrating the 
state’s influence on arrangements in voluntary services . However, with the progressive 
promotion of outsourcing during the 1990s, the visible VS domain increased, as did the 
state’s influence in shaping its activities. By 2010 this domain encompassed diverse 
organisations, from small community service providers and campaigning organisations to 
large charities with trading arms and social enterprises, drawing a wider range of 
organisations within the state’s governable terrain (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). The 
Coalition’s rebranding of the Office of the Third Sector as the Office for Civil Society 
(OCS) signals this extension of its remit and policy influence to wider civil society – to 
informal community groups and citizens – alongside explicit policy to direct individual 
welfare behaviours (Brown, 2012). As Alcock and Kendall (2011) argue, the process of 
mainstreaming under New Labour encouraged decontested spaces within which many VOs 
concurred with hegemonic discourse and behaviours, anticipating gains in legitimacy and 
resources. Many VOs assumed these new cultures apparently by choice (Harris, 2010), or 
in an isomorphic process of imitating, or conforming to, the norms of surrounding 
organisational arrangements. There were, conversely, spaces which remained contested 
(Milbourne, 2013) and, as resources become scarcer and requirements more stringent, these 
may become more widespread. It is to explore the extension of supposedly consensual 
spaces and coerced arrangements, and their scope and effects, that the paper draws on the 
two aspects of theory below.  
The effects of isomorphism 
The process of organisations conforming to dominant arrangements in the surrounding 
organisational environment has been analysed as isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 
1983), with legitimacy granted to those displaying approved characteristics. While 
pressures towards homogeneity among VOs have been largely state driven, they often 
operate most powerfully through expectations within similar service fields (Aberg, 2013), 
and are also advanced through resource dependency (Pfeffer, 2003) and competitive 
funding arrangements. Thus the growth of competitive markets, as more public services are 
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outsourced, alongside the loss of grants and special projects affecting VOs, intensifies 
coercive isomorphic pressures. The consequence of isomorphism is a gradual 
homogenisation of organisations working within similar fields, producing contexts where 
the rational outcome of efforts to deal with both uncertainties and performance controls 
constructs overall similarities in organisational cultures and arrangements.  
These arguments are familiar to scholars of organisational and VS research, and we discuss 
only briefly how these pressures become operationalised through funding and monitoring 
mechanisms; inter-agency relationships; professional standards; resource dependency; and, 
especially, dominant understandings of what counts as legitimate action and arrangements.  
In summary, the spread of public services outsourcing since the 1990s, with associated 
managerial and monitoring cultures (Baines et al., 2011), prompted needs among VOs for 
professional management skills which became integral to their changing practices (Harris, 
2010). Resource dependency and contract requirements produce enforced modifications to 
activities (coercive isomorphism) which, in the longer term, limit alternative practices and 
aspirations and slowly transform self-definition. These trends of professionalisation and 
commercialisation are also mirrored in processes re-shaping civil society organisations 
internationally (Eikenberry, 2009).   
Not all isomorphic pressures are coercive. As Aberg (2013) argues, there may be 
significant incentives for choosing closer co-operation with the state or private sector; for 
adopting what appear as normative mainstream arrangements; and for becoming more 
market-oriented. Tensions arise when disparate meanings collide internally and at 
organisational boundaries producing questions about the consensual or contested nature of 
changes. If VOs internalise discourses and operational practices which bestow external 
legitimacy, while continuing to claim cultural credibility through former goals, conflicting 
narratives may emerge around how purposes are understood, with some organisational 
actors adhering to the former mission and others focusing on activities determined by new 
arrangements.  
The dangers are that, in striving for greater external legitimacy, a VO decouples from its 
civil society origins and from the meanings and purposes that ground it with members, 
service users or community stakeholders; and ensuing tensions and ambiguities weaken 
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organisational identity. For example, Hucklesby and Corcoran’s (2013) study shows that as 
VOs have engaged in large-scale criminal justice contracts involving prison services, they 
have increasingly been drawn into administering sanctions. The extended scope of their 
service delivery roles has thus undermined previous roles in supporting prisoners and 
advocating reforms, deterring former sponsors.  
Research also illustrates that VOs that have resisted external pressures to retain core 
missions and sustain grassroots connections (Harris and Young, 2009; Milbourne, 2013). 
This may result from recognising internal tensions or contesting unwanted external 
pressures to change. Such contested spaces may be sustained to some degree through 
mimetic isomorphism where clusters of similar VOs exist within an organisational field or 
locality, and peer behaviours exert greater influence than hierarchical pressures. 
Organisations may also choose to imitate apparently successful local models, especially if 
these appear to confer increased status within their fields or to enhance growth or survival 
related to their goals. However, within such clusters, larger organisations and those with 
longer established practices often dominate arrangements, effectively suppressing 
alternative approaches. This can be construed as normative isomorphic pressure: adopting 
what is widely considered as ‘the way things are done’ Hoggett (2004: 196). 
With austerity and public sector budget reductions, pressures towards mergers and 
entrepreneurial activities became integral to New Labour’s stage directions for VOs 
(Rochester, 2013), and were echoed in the Coalition’s exhortations to seize entrepreneurial 
opportunities (OCS, 2010). The emphasis on business links and entrepreneurialism has now 
pervaded sections of the VS to the extent that some VOs have rebranded as ‘social 
enterprises’; and many acknowledge choosing to adopt particular models, language or 
behaviours, which enable them to gain a competitive edge. However, as the adoption of 
behaviours spreads, there is also a reflexive process which constructs a culture of 
expectation that these changes are necessary to underpin legitimacy and success. While 
useful in understanding how powerful cultures of arrangements induce shifts in 
organisational models more widely, isomorphic tendencies are insufficient, by themselves, 
to explain the fundamental recasting of VS roles discussed above, nor the contested spaces; 
and we examine governmentality to explore these questions further.  
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Governmentality and the integral role of the state 
With increased outsourcing of public services over some 25 years, VS relationships with 
the state have significantly re-shaped the nature of its activities, remodelling its 
contributions to welfare and society through marketisation, managerialism and associated 
monitoring regimes (Milbourne, 2013). Arguably, as VOs delivered more state services and 
projects, their influence and mainstream legitimacy grew, while independent activities and 
criticism of government agencies became more inhibited. However, until recently, VOs 
have maintained their ability to operate within public agencies and also to criticise them: 
both in and against the state (Holloway, 2005). 
Managerialism (Clarke et al., 2000), criticised for importing excessive command and 
control structures into public service management (Brown, 2010), subsequently pervaded 
the VS. Equally, the spread of marketisation has distorted service goals and approaches 
through imposing contract criteria and performance targets (Milbourne and Cushman, 
2013). However, the recent scaling-up of contracts and intensification of competition, 
justified as a means to deliver more efficient and effective services, has constructed a 
fundamental realignment of publicly funded activities and ideas about welfare purposes and 
beneficiaries (Hoggett et al., 2013).  
Miller and Rose (1990: 3–4) examine the expansion of governed spaces achieved through 
policy (and associated cultures of arrangements), applying Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality. They explain that, ‘policies always appear surrounded by more or less 
systematised attempts to adjudicate on their vices and virtues’ and may be superseded by 
others promising improvements or ‘advocating something different’. Therefore policies and 
the mechanisms for their implementation, appear as harmless programmatic means to 
achieving desired outcomes but are ways of implanting and ensuring changes of a highly 
political nature. Similarly, arrangements for monitoring and evaluation, while seeming to 
assess effective implementation, are integral to the powers of change embedded in policy 
systems and to understanding how processes of governmentality operate. 
It is therefore not simply overt technologies or financial threats which enforce policy 
compliance in managerial and contractual arrangements but also the related implementation 
mechanisms – schemas, templates and associated discourse – which together institute the 
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necessary discipline through knowable, calculable and administrable objects. Within the 
VS, these schemas manifest themselves through contract criteria; increasingly detailed 
specifications and targets; required performance data; and the language and means through 
which they are communicated – ultimately the cultures of arrangements and behaviours 
through which organisational actors conform (Milbourne and Cushman, 2013). Such 
requirements demand forms of professionalisation, and standardisation and homogenisation 
of approaches, denominating activities in the currency of those governing rather than the 
governed. However, they also have the effect of significantly changing the focus of 
activities and ultimately purposes, gradually transforming organisational meanings and 
perceptions of successful work. Effectively governmentality ensures receptivity to policy 
instruments and their underlying logics. 
Rational choice theory and critiques of state bureaucracies opened the way for market 
denominated reforms and, subsequently, a quest for more flexible forms of governance in 
public services (Bevir, 2011), visible in partnership working and the Coalition’s localism 
strategies. Such models are purportedly better suited to modern and consensual forms of 
governance than hierarchical management (Davies, 2011). However, new public 
management cultures persistently dominate collaborative community projects and 
associated arrangements (Lever, 2011), showing how hierarchical power habitually 
reasserts itself, defining the rules of play (Clegg, 1989). Moreover, as Davies (2011) 
argues, masking these persistent hierarchies and the hegemonic powers of the state and 
allied agencies within apparently more open governance forms serves dominant neo-liberal 
political interests, deceptively communicating norms and consensus. 
VOs have had limited discussion in debates around governmentality. Carmel and Harlock 
(2008) illustrate ways that New Labour established and extended its influence through 
outsourcing public services and use of cross-sector partnerships and planning fora. Many 
VOs were complicit in extending the reach of this governable terrain through participation 
in these arrangements, conveying government priorities into previously more autonomous 
community-based work. By positioning themselves within these spaces, VOs have 
facilitated compliance with governmentally driven projects and reduced the room for 
independent challenges, seeking legitimacy and influence through insider tactics while 
contributing to marginalising those pursuing alternatives. As Hoggett (2004) argues, an 
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assumed culture of consensus invariably prevails in such settings, suppressing alternative 
arrangements. Consequently, the creative welfare solutions which VOs have often 
contributed, become excluded, belying any purported aims of openness to service 
innovation.  
As the Coalition restricts the powers and scope of local government, and corporations 
increase their share of ‘public’ service delivery, power over shaping service conditions and 
activities is shifting, with VOs increasingly excluded. Many VOs lack the financial 
credentials to be eligible as contractors; have insufficient reserves to survive under the 
terms of sub-contracts; and have suffered significant financial losses, as corporations 
maximise profits at the expense of effective frontline delivery (Rees et al., 2013). While 
this describes the effects of changes, it also speaks to a supposed consensus that finds the 
exclusion and potential demise of many community providers acceptable, and believes 
new, scaled-up contracts and the associated costs of procurement and supply-chain 
transactions generate better services.   
Power appears to have shifted towards corporate contractors. However, it would be 
erroneous to disregard the integral role of the state in engineering the environment 
encompassing the different sectors. To make sense of these changes requires examining the 
hegemonic processes underpinning and sustaining beliefs in the state’s apparent withdrawal 
and the appropriateness of markets and neo-liberal economic prescriptions to deliver 
effective services. The growing gaps in services demonstrate that these changes flow from 
political ideas rather than being rationally justified; as do the poor service reputations and 
misreporting of profit-led contractors (Wright, 2013) and the evident failures of 
corporations heavily engaged in provision of which they have little experience (Long, 
2012). To mask these defects, the focus has shifted instead to expecting individuals and 
communities to fill the welfare gaps created. Residual welfare, passed to voluntary activity, 
is heralded positively as a means to promote a more responsible, less welfare-dependent 
citizenship (Brown, 2012). 
Thus the Coalition government has promoted attitudinal shifts, alongside rationing and 
conditionality in welfare, and a massive upheaval in delivery mechanisms; and these 
address moral judgements about what is fair or who is deserving of public support. 
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Tackling presumed welfare dependency forcefully and representing it as substantially 
responsible for public debts, has allowed the Coalition to exploit existing social fractures 
(Hogget et al., 2013) and advance and justify a stronger rhetoric around dismantling the 
public sector. 
Thus, within this new service framework, VOs are somewhat incidental, encouraged both 
to participate in the supply chain and to concentrate on local associational (voluntary) 
activities. Campaigning charities are criticised (DCLG, 2012) and the most entrepreneurial 
VOs are lauded (OCS, 2010). The re-engineering of the public sphere might be slowed if 
alternative altruistic approaches or potentially subversive VOs were more welcome; but 
new frameworks have been constructed largely to restrict or exclude them and silence 
dissenting voices. However, the decline in state funding to VOs for outsourced services and 
community projects suggests an unintended opportunity to reclaim independence: a freeing 
up from the influence and powers of the state. However, this space is debatable, not least 
because of the recent dispersal of governable terrain through Localism and Open Public 
Services; and much depends on how VOs confront the dilemmas of changing arrangements.  
The consensual assumptions embedded in political messages around norms and 
expectations are integral to strategies aimed to shift both individual and organisational 
behaviours in desired directions.The creation of a unit drawing on nudge theory (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008) is a concrete sign of the Coalition government extending its reach to the 
behaviours of welfare users. Nudge theory, based on behavioural economics and cognitive 
psychology, has informed both US and UK government strategies intended to re-shape 
behaviours and deter those deemed discordant with dominant views and economic needs. 
Agents of local communities, VOs and civil society actors become crucial components in a 
‘civilising’ role – constructed rhetorically as Big Society or Localism – intended to 
reinforce consensually driven processes of civilising welfare (Lever, 2011) that are 
instituted as norms but there are alternatives. There are also punitive measures for 
dissenters, enforced through harsher controls. Thus nudging behaviour can be construed as 
disciplining groups and individuals, and punishments as the outcome of failures to adapt. 
However, as controls and disciplines become more exacting, there is greater potential for 
triggering resistance and re-assertion of alternative meanings (Foucault, 1977). The 
government’s attitude to food banks offers a striking example. As largely faith-based 
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groups, independent of public funds, they seem to encapsulate the Big Society but are 
censured for their powerful, if implicit, critique of austerity policies, defying hegemonic 
discourse.  
Isomorphism and governmentality can both be interpreted over-deterministically. 
Conceptualising the power of governmentality as the temporal resolution of a relational 
network of forces in society, embedded in predominant values, rituals, assumed beliefs and 
institutional practices (Foucault, 1977), is helpful in understanding the intersection of 
agency with these influences. In other words, while the discussion above has considered 
macro-level trends, everyday practical examples also demonstrate ways that VOs, their 
staff and user groups, adopt and also resist influences. For example, the pressures to 
survive, which may mean entering an underfunded supply-chain and complicity with poor 
services, are already leading to demise for some VOs (Bawden, 2013), prompting reflection 
on other options. There is therefore the potential to withdraw from the state’s projects in 
realigning public services, to decouple from state funding dependency and strengthen 
alternatives; and the next part of the paper explores dilemmas being played out through 
examples from different contexts. 
Study of everyday experiences 
Empirical research on changes among voluntary organisations, since Coalition policies 
began to take effect, is limited but examples are emerging. Below we discuss findings from 
several recent studies. Our examples are drawn from three area-based case studies in 
relatively deprived inner-city areas of England, focused on experiences and outcomes of 
recent changes. Most VOs in these studies were small service providers, many working 
with young people, some also involved in campaigning and advocacy. Case studies have 
the advantage of enabling detailed study (Stake, 2000) which can examine situated 
experiences of changing social policies. In parallel, wider social forces influence the actors 
involved, and our analysis also reconnects examples with wider contexts and meanings, 
recognising the interlinked nature of institutions, governmental strategies and agency in 
accounting for local experiences and outcomes (Barnes and Prior, 2009).  
Our research also includes data from a further qualitative study (2011–13) in which 
participants from larger charities discussed recent experiences related to the work 
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programme. Most data were gathered between 2010 and 2013 but in one case, Horizons, 
the organisation formed part of an ongoing study commenced in 1999, supplemented by 
follow up interviews. Further detail on these studies is available in (Milbourne,2013). All 
names of people, organisations and places are pseudonyms. 
In what follows, we have organised our examples thematically, initially considering the 
effects on VOs of scaled-up and progressively more restrictive contracts in an increasingly 
competitive environment. We then examine examples of constraints on independent 
expression and, thirdly, the space for resistance. Our examples demonstrate isomorphic 
pressures, often visible through more concrete phenomena, while illustrating 
governmentality at work in the broader re-shaping processes and restrictions on 
independent activities and voice over time.  
Contracts as discipline: working in the Work Programme 
This case concerns the remodelling of service provision, with increasing controls on VOs’ 
activities. It focuses on Network Plus (NP), an example from our research in 2011–13. NP 
is a large, national VO working with the unemployed across England and Wales, 
established some 35 years ago in neighbourhood centres in an English urban area. NP grew 
steadily over 10 years up to 2010, developing regional centres and delivering advice and 
support, diversifying with collaboratively funded community centre projects, while still 
concentrating on the unemployed. NP gained a reputation locally and nationally for 
successfully sustaining people in work, with previously unemployed people contributing to 
voluntary advice work, and also creating non-profit enterprises like a drop-in cafe. The last 
few years has seen NP become more overtly enterprising, extending projects, bidding for 
larger contracts, establishing trading ventures and professional fund-raising schemes, and 
adapting to normative isomorphic pressures.  
NP bid for contracts under the Work Programme in several regions, collaborating with 
private contractors but was mainly unsuccessful, and, like many other VOs, experienced 
wide-scale loss of direct contracts and difficulty in gaining adequately funded sub-contracts 
(Marsden, 2011). The rapid shifts in control over provision for the unemployed reflect the 
extent of changes engineered through scaling-up contracts, and the use of financial criteria 
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and business reputation to determine contract allocations in preference to service expertise 
or experience. Several consequences of this re-engineering are described below.   
VOs seeking greater engagement in new service programmes often anticipate increased 
legitimacy and therefore greater influence over the shape of services by assuming new 
requirements. This may have succeeded in the pre-Coalition years but, as VOs enter this 
intensified service market alongside or under private sector competitors, the more flexible 
ethos and approaches that they aspire to bring to services are progressively becoming 
submerged by contract priorities and complex arrangements. A locally based NP manager, 
running schemes for unemployed youth, highlighted the intensely competitive environment 
‘producing bidding wars among us, so we forget why we’re here – we’ve been 
reprogrammed simply to win’. This growing culture exacerbated divisions amongst VOs 
previously allied locally as advocates for better services. 
Discussing her experience of recent changes, a regional NP manager, Shelley, described the 
extent to which the risks of payment by results were flowing downwards to sub-contractors 
as a ‘pretty brutal awakening’. The harsh contract culture was threatening NP’s financial 
survival and also their underlying, successful approaches to work with the unemployed. 
Stringent contract conditions and the effects of payment by results serve to restrict 
flexibility and induce mission drift, shifting priorities, and activities closer to centrally 
controlled agendas and arrangements to the detriment of proven service models. A local co-
ordinator commented, ‘never mind the informal work...we can’t afford not to meet the 
targets’. She also conceded that: ‘Survival now, may depend on limiting vision and 
creativity in projects, narrowing approaches, “parking” clients or restricting activities to 
those most likely to succeed.’ Thus this contract regime impacts on service quality and 
beneficiaries, and examples illustrate how well-meaning providers are led to neglect some 
of the hardest to help groups in society. Additionally, contract compliance draws VOs into 
administering sanctions, such as reducing benefits for claimants who miss interviews and, 
in a complex extension of state-led agency to non-state actors, re-locates the dilemmas and 
contradictions of punitive frameworks.  
Pressures to narrow the focus of activities and to administer sanctions can be read as 
coercive isomorphism but also discourage innovative developments, gradually generating a 
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culture and meanings among workers and agencies focused on meeting prescribed 
outcomes within a restricted range. Accordingly, changes to activities and focus become 
assimilated and embedded as the way things are done, exemplifying the pervasiveness of 
governmentality and its distorting effects, and gradually eroding expectations of services 
for both workers and beneficiaries.  
Scaled-up contracting within a professional service field also presses organisations to move 
from more specialist or locally responsive provision to more generic services. New 
contracting processes, as Shelley emphasised, partly involved covert compliance: ‘fitting in 
with the …culture’, including expectations of ‘doing more for less’. The Work Programme, 
with just 18 contract areas across the UK and two to three prime contractors controlling 
funded provision in each area, reveals stark examples of technologies of governmentality 
promoting service homogenisation: providers controlled through schemas ensured by harsh 
contract terms; payment by results; and gagging clauses around financial information and 
performance. Inevitably local provision varies, and specified activities and performance 
controls may be unwittingly or deliberately subverted, as examples below demonstrate, but 
regimes of restrictive practices have undoubtedly multiplied, instilling a culture of 
compliance.   
The Work Programme is not a unique example, and recent studies in criminal justice 
indicate similar findings (Hucklesby and Corcoran, 2013). Our examples show both 
normative and coercive isomorphic pressures: the assimilation of competitive and new 
contracting cultures; the narrowing of activities and approaches; and imposition of 
sanctions. However, it is the longer term restructuring of welfare programmes and re-
engineering of service cultures – together with the encompassing of activities such as 
supplementary support services that were previously the independent province of VOs – 
into composite contracts that demonstrates the spread of the governable terrain to 
previously independent VS spheres of expertise. Within this terrain, the activities that VOs 
can contemplate are controlled. 
Constraining dissenting voices in Wharton 
Our second set of examples concern constraints on spaces for independent expression 
because of service contracts which encroach on VOs’ freedoms to campaign and advocate 
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for service users and around underfunded and deteriorating provision; and also because of 
restrictions on speaking truth to power more widely. 
Self-censorship is growing often because of fears of losing funding. Our study in Wharton, 
a deprived inner-city area, conducted between 2011 and 2013, illustrates, as in the previous 
example, the increasing need to demonstrate competitive advantage – such as by adopting 
the discourse and modes of operation of funders – in order to win contracts. Chris, from a 
VS infrastructure organisation, underlined that VOs needed to ‘change their expectations 
and sell themselves better’, while Deena running a small social enterprise, similarly, talked 
about telling ‘the story funders want to hear…for current times’ rather than exposing 
unwelcome problems. Deena had successfully gained one of the recently scaled-up youth 
contracts, at the expense of existing providers, describing her entrepreneurial attitude as 
key to her success. 
Other examples illustrate how self-censorship silences discussion of service failures, posing 
barriers to mutual organisational learning. Dan, responsible for provision for young teenage 
fathers, highlighted ways that the nature of what can be discussed – the whole discourse for 
exchange of information – had changed. Failures or limited progress made with young men 
in the targeted time frame, ‘are things you just can’t talk about now. Funders ... want 
success factors; they’re not interested in what we do as such ... though that’s crucial to 
success’. Discussion of other similar cases (Milbourne, 2013) alongside Deena’s description 
of her successful mode of operation, shows that this culture of ‘things that can’t be talked 
about’ encourages gaming in bids and performance reporting and restricts public 
knowledge about service problems. 
Both examples reveal the underlying pressures which shape discourse and reporting 
activities and suppress openness about service performance. Whether receptive to gaming 
(Deena) – mimetic isomorphism – or succumbing to pressures from necessity (Dan) – 
coercive isomorphism – the outcomes exacerbate the effects of competition, undermining 
collaboration among small VOs and shared learning from service failures. These elements 
of self-censorship also surrender considerable power for shaping service narratives to 
dominant agencies – governments and corporations – who thus instil and extend their rules 
of play, generating more frequent examples of lack of integrity in services and performance 
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reporting (Long, 2012) 
Suppressing more direct forms of advocacy is a further example of self-censorship, 
promoted through isomorphic pressures and induced through acceptance of the way things 
work. For some time now, research has identified a tension for a sector which attempts to 
provide services on behalf of government and advocacy on behalf of its users (Cairns et al., 
2010), seeking to influence policy-making and decisions but hesitating to ‘bite the hand 
that feeds it’. This tension around operating both in and against the state is evident in trends 
towards increased use of insider tactics (Mosley, 2011; Milbourne, 2013): adopting 
mainstream discourse and modes of operation to gain legitimacy and influence. Speaking 
the language of funders may offer advantages in greater influence over service and resource 
decisions but this kind of ‘cosy campaigning’ marginalises diverse voices and excludes less 
comfortable issues. Shifting discourse and modes of operation, as many VOs have over 
time, provide good examples of both mimetic and coercive isomorphism, depending on the 
extent to which these have been ‘freely’ adopted, or resulted from coercive pressures, such 
as those related to financial survival. However, as these ‘freely’ adopted practices become 
established, the room for VOs to operate independently and with alternative models and 
meanings, is visibly diminished, showing how governmentality has successfully embedded 
and is dominating cultures and routines.  
This successful dominance of cultures and routines was also evident in undermining the 
development of responsive young people’s services. Despite the policy focus on use of 
local experience, our findings from young people’s projects  illustrate feelings of mistrust 
and that their knowledge was granted little legitimacy. Engaged in research on a large 
housing estate, a group of young people wanted to ‘make a difference’ and ‘create changes’ 
in their area but reported that ‘no action, not even a response’ resulted. They concluded that 
their recommendations were uncomfortable and would not be pursued. While they reported 
positive experiences from their collective endeavour, their abilities to pursue and realise 
change were thwarted because of the persistence of powerful institutional norms and 
arrangements which discounted alternative interests and approaches.  
If self-censorship fails, those presenting alternative models, such as the young people 
above, are increasingly being sidelined. However, direct censorship, often emanating from 
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government, is also growing, with more VOs highlighting ‘gagging clauses’ in contracts 
and other restrictions on freedom of expression. Our examples indicate that contracts 
increasingly prevent providers not only from disclosing financial information but also from 
publicly revealing service problems as they emerge’. Management and performance data for 
the Work Programme can only be published via the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) unless, as is starting to happen, frustrated workers or service users speak out about 
unprofessional practices (Wright, 2013). Government advice to local authorities to 
withdraw funding from charities that lobby for improved service funding or to alleviate the 
negative service experiences of recent contracts (DCLG, 2012) adds to examples of 
constraints on whistle-blowing. Further, the legitimacy of charities campaigning has been 
directly challenged; for example, Save the Children was publicly criticised for the alleged 
political nature of its anti-poverty campaign (CESI, 2012).  
The growing restrictions on sharing service information and proposing improvements, 
alongside the political attack on the right to advocate and campaign, conflict with 
traditional assumptions about the role of autonomous VOs and civil society to make 
information public and to ensure diverse voices are heard. This threat was recently 
amplified in the 2014 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade 
Union Administration Act. While examples of self-censorship and suppression of advocacy 
and alternatives show how governmentality operates through assumed consensus, and tacit 
threats to funding and legitimacy, silencing freedom of expression through direct 
censorship signifies a worrying progression in state powers.   
Contested spaces: Horizons’ work in youth justice 
There may be alternatives, and Foucault (1977) argues that harsh disciplinary regimes 
breed resistance. Horizons, a small inner-city VO, with a 30-year history of work with 
disengaged young people in the youth justice system, illustrates an organisation that 
initially accommodated normative isomorphic influences but, more recently, has resisted 
and rebuffed pressures to conform to external expectations.  
Since 1999, Horizons has moved from local government social services grant funding to a 
riskier education services contract, accepting the need to conform to a problematic 
monitoring regime and accommodating normative isomorphic pressures as a necessity in a 
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changing climate, in exchange for funding continuity. However, with a history in youth 
work, tensions emerged when growing performance demands, and an extended range of 
young people referred to the project, became unmanageable and diverted resources and 
activities, triggering mission drift. Horizons reviewed its goals and resolved to re-
emphasise its specialist focus on young people ‘in trouble’. It re-negotiated funding, 
securing a more flexible contract with the local Youth Offending Service (YOS), thus 
resisting governmental incursions into its autonomous domain.  
However external pressures to increase capacity intensified. The neighbouring YOS 
pursued Horizons to take on a contract which would have doubled their places. Again, 
internal tensions ensued; the co-ordinator’s comments, reflecting considerable discussion, 
disclose the reasons for their decision: 
There’s such strong pressure towards big is best and Riverdon YOS wants us to sign 
up ... there’d be gains. But … there’s always hidden catches. So ... we’ve said we’ll 
take a few extra young people if we have space ... but we won’t have a whole new 
contract.  
The pressures continued with Horizons staff funded to participate as advisors in a pilot 
youth crime prevention project, involving outreach work on local social housing estates. 
Their advice helped the local council to gain Home Office funding for a large project but 
once the contract specifications emerged, the terms looked problematic. Funding was 
loaded heavily towards successful outcomes but required meeting unrealistic performance 
targets involving young people moving from potentially crime-related activities into 
training and work within short timescales. These laid Horizons open to significant risks, 
both financial and reputational. A trustee explained their reasons for not pursuing the funds, 
despite significant pressure to do so, including their need for income.  
We got involved because it’s prevention work ... But how they wanted it run ... it’s 
not worth it ... They invited us to pilot activities because they recognised our 
expertise and it helped access Home Office money. But now it’s a big risk ... so no. 
They’re puzzled why we’re not going forward. But chasing the money, survival at 
any price, isn’t right.   
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When VOs have withstood normative pressures, it is often the financial need to survive and 
maintain badly needed services that produces coercive isomorphic pressure towards 
conformity. As a surrounding organisational culture of compliance spreads and becomes 
more dominant, additional organisations mimic or adopt assumed norms, enabling insidious 
arrangements to permeate further, shoring up governmental controls. Resistant VOs, such 
as Horizons, risk becoming exiles. 
Horizons is now facing hard times and a vulnerable future, with funding cuts, and rising 
demands and costs. However, taking on the crime prevention contract may not have 
protected it, despite normative assumptions about the advantages of growth and 
diversification. Similar youth work projects in adjacent areas have lost contracts, suffering 
large funding reductions, and some have closed. Horizons has survived past crises and its 
niche position as a specialist ‘youth justice’ provider, alongside its reputation for successful 
practice, still works in its favour, as do its clarity and coherence of purpose and relative 
organisational stability over time. While bucking mainstream trends and maintaining 
independent purposes, rather than becoming subsumed into governmental agendas, its 
survival may still depend on elements of accommodation and resistance. This dual path is 
one that Horizons has negotiated effectively until recently but, as earlier discussion 
suggests, this is rapidly becoming impossible. 
Resisting mainstream arrangements carries risks. Non-compliance is potentially a signal of 
untrustworthiness to government, threatening reputation and funding, distinguishing a VO 
from others  Lost favour with local government agencies also damages external legitimacy 
and influence over local services. Organisations are thus disciplined to conform and assume 
specified activities and agendas and, contrary to government rhetoric around extending 
locally responsive approaches, such arrangements diminish both local providers’ and 
service users’ influence. This paradox underlies the potential spaces for taking back power 
for those VOs committed to alternatives.  
Discussion: re-locating power and the integral role of the state 
Little has prepared VOs for either the rapidity of change or the extent of financial losses 
recently experienced, or for the devaluing and subsequent realignment of VS roles in public 
services. While the preference now being granted to corporate contractors suggests that 
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closer scrutiny of relationships with business is necessary, our research emphasises that we 
should keep sight of the state’s integral role in engineering this new environment. Recent 
changes are not just about discounting the value previously ascribed to the VS and ushering 
in corporations though, of course, that is happening. These governmentally driven 
arrangements are rapidly opening up public services and shedding state responsibilities for 
welfare provision, prompting a fundamental change in public understanding of the state’s 
role. The incursion of the state into independent VS terrain is not new but among other 
contemporary changes – severe welfare cuts and re-engineering of public services – this 
growing encroachment has made VOs more susceptible to external pressures and 
restrictions. The scale and rapidity of current changes similarly exacerbates this 
susceptibility. 
Contrary to their rhetoric of curbing ‘big government’, central government has taken 
considerable power while ostensibly ceding it to ‘communities’ under the guise of localism, 
and to corporate contractors through widespread outsourcing of public services. Both 
strategies have extended the governable terrain into previously autonomous domains of 
civil society. Paradoxically, localism has reallocated controls from local government to 
central government, while devolving responsibility for welfare failures, but not power, to 
local groups of people. As our research shows, voluntary support work, previously the 
province of independent VOs, has also been subject to governmental controls and, in some 
cases, inclusion in marketised government programmes.   
New Public Management (and new VS management) prescribes routines for activities, 
which have spread isomorphically. However, domination of VS cultures and arrangements 
are more deeply embedded through processes of governmentality. It is assumed that neo-
liberalism enables a retreat of state power; but more fluid arrangements ensure that actors 
internalise the virtues of arrangements and approaches of powerful agencies, and suppress 
others, securing actors’ complicity while they are apparently acting independently. 
Negotiating, securing and maintaining the regulatory and legal infrastructure for market 
arrangements requires continual state activity (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 141) contesting 
the claim that markets and contracts are self-regulating and need no government intrusion.  
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Isomorphic changes are not particular to one field of welfare, and homogenised service 
contracts are becoming widespread (Rees et al., 2013), although pressures within particular 
services, such as in the Work Programme, may be more exacting. Engaging in these new 
contracts, as our example shows, draws VOs further into the disciplines of administering 
sanctions, such as benefit reductions – previously the remit of the state – and extends 
contractual controls to previously independent VS activities. Work Programme providers 
describe a contractual regime controlled through harsh terms and punitive financial 
conditions, forcing them to limit activities and more meaningful approaches, and to shed 
claimants unlikely to achieve short-term targets. Consequently structural barriers to 
employment and institutional service failures, such as poor quality support, are both 
obscured and reinforced, categorising some groups in society as disposable or outside 
safety-nets of projects, a Work Programme outcome reported more widely (Horton, 2013).  
Issues of measuring outcomes and the dominance of managerial arrangements have shaped 
and constrained VOs across varied service fields for some time. However, the recent scale 
of contracts and resulting take-overs to meet turnover criteria are producing a contractual 
and sub-contracting environment of increasingly exacting specifications embedded in 
assumptions that market arrangements, of themselves, ‘deliver value’. Yet both the Work 
Programme and Wharton examples identify potentially impoverished activities and 
destructive cultures of self-censorship around emerging service problems, sometimes 
provoking gaming around performance reporting. 
For many years, the VS has acted as a critical friend to the state, highlighting shortfalls in 
welfare and providing additional services, while increasingly during the New Labour years, 
being drawn into delivering outsourced public services. However, our examples illustrate 
ways that VOs are now being silenced both because of tacit threats to funding and through 
direct censorship. These growing threats to freedom of expression speak of powerful 
governmental controls at work, concealing service failures and injustices. Such silencing 
denotes a constraint, not only on civil society organisations – in terms of  what they can and 
can’t do – but, worse, a broader re-shaping of democratic freedoms. Restraining VOs from 
‘speaking truth to power’ restricts a crucial role for civil society organisations in a healthy 
democracy. 
-23- 
Horizons shows that not all VOs have assumed compliance. While some may have 
conformed to normative expectations during earlier political periods, those adaptions have 
often been tempered by overriding missions while political regimes permitted, and, in 
parallel with examples discussed elsewhere (Milbourne, 2013), have combined elements of 
accommodation with resistance. Contemporary changes are posing harsher choices; while 
some VOs have complied with dominant trends in this new environment, working 
increasingly hard to adapt and survive, others are choosing to decouple in the hope of 
sustaining alternative models and creating spaces for better services. 
A fragmenting voluntary sector? 
We would argue with others (Macmillan, 2013a) that the VS can no longer be viewed as a 
single entity and divisions are increasingly visible; and finding spaces for resistance and to 
operate with alternative models is posing new dilemmas. Analysis and sense-making for 
different segments of the sector may mean building new bridges and strengthening interest-
based alliances with other congruent groups and organisations or previously neglected 
partners. The common political and campaigning interests that VOs share locally with 
public sector workers, trade unions and wider social movements are therefore important for 
those VOs seeking to resist the prevailing governmental zeitgeist. Whatever new alliances 
are made, extending analysis of recent VS changes is crucial in constructing a stronger 
narrative for its present and future, which must take account of the radically changing 
welfare landscape emerging in the Coalition government’s later years.  
However, our findings indicate that re-alignment of VS roles in welfare requires critical 
reflection on the limitations internalised through processes of governmentality but the 
agency of VOs to re-imagine their role is often severely restricted. With localism and the 
opening up of public services, complexity and fragmentation in relationships surrounding 
VOs have also increased as public services become privatised. Local and national 
government agencies are mutating; and the locus of power is shifting. This makes it harder 
for VOs to navigate governmental relationships, weakening potential for resistance. If the 
VS is simply marginalised, it may open the door to the most powerful players determining 
the outcomes whereas the kinds of cross-sector alliances identified above may help to 
counter neo-liberal ideas of VOs and civil society organisations and their purposes, and 
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establish and strengthen an alternative discourse. The VS has become disputed territory, 
involving, as Macmillan (2013b: 50) identifies, a ‘struggle for hegemony in which some 
voices, interests and alliances prevail and may achieve partial and temporary influence and 
domination’. The territory remains contested. 
Constructing a different future? 
Davies (2011) argues that governmentality, as a part of the neo-liberal project to enrol and 
transform civil society, invariably dominates attempts to foster an egalitarian ethos, 
suppressing contested spaces and divergent models. However, a better understanding of the 
ways in which power is enacted and reinforced can also be used to challenge and 
sometimes redefine the terms of engagement. VOs committed to sharing power with 
service users and sustaining grassroots connections provide examples of resisting the 
pressures of dominant cultures and normative assumptions about arrangements.  
The ‘invited spaces’ for influence are insufficient (Taylor, 2011: 305) and shrinking. 
Neither political nor business leaders have an interest in sharing power, resources or 
privileges; resistance and constructive changes for poorer communities will need to be 
pursued by those concerned to counter their growing hegemony.  
Institutional theory used to explain organisational transitions has been criticised for being 
applied uncritically, and for neglecting the role of agency (Willmott, 2013). Instead, we 
have considered isomorphism and governmentality from a critical perspective to shed light 
on ways that VOs are drawn into problematic compromises but may also refuse and subvert 
hegemonic pressures. The resistance illustrated above and elsewhere (NCIA, 2014) 
demonstrates individual actors and VOs asserting alternatives to pervasive forces shaping 
action and communications in the interests of powerful institutions. An overly deterministic 
interpretation of governmentality, focusing only on ways that conformity is being realised, 
risks discounting the significant role of such agency, whether used intentionally or 
unwittingly. From Foucault’s (1977) work, it is also clear that we should not discount 
agency in understanding governmentality: the power and discipline of harsh regimes also 
triggers resistance, potentially shifting the provisional balance of arrangements in contested 
spaces.  
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In conclusion, isomorphism and governmentality provide valuable frameworks for 
examining broad changes affecting VOs, both overall transitions and increased VS 
fragmentation. However, they offer limited explanation for the complexity of responses 
visible at the level of everyday organisational dilemmas and activities. This highlights the 
value of micro- as well as macro-level research and argues for attending to agency while 
seeking to understand and critique the bigger picture. Patterns of change examined here are 
inevitably the focus of ongoing research necessary to map the aspirations and activities of 
VOs and their contribution to maintaining critical alternatives in the future. 
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